» Articles » A fate of the ballistic anti-missile defense in Central Europe: a view from Slovakia 27.04.2013 (5191)

Up to 2009, the European NATO allies (especially some „old“ ones) obviously seemed to believe that first, the U.S. need Europe more than vice versa, second that the U.S. needs an mediator between Moscow and Washington and third, that Europe can pragmatically oscillate between loyalties to its North American ally and its interests in the Middle East.

In this respect, the first half of the new U.S. administration brought about a sort of foreign and security policy sobering. The new American administration entered into a direct communication with Moscow and the Arabic countries rendering the European „intermediation“ largely unnecessary. Possible victims of this new course might be just Europe (especially Central Eastern Europe) and Israel. The anti-missile defense has not yet been fully relinquished by the U. S. (with Turkey becoming the new site for the ABMD in 2011) but is seems that it is up to Europe now to invest – politically and financially – into the ABMD, into minimizing the Iranian nuclear threat, into removing the threat of the new radicalization in Afghanistan and elsewhere and into diminishing its dependency on strategic materials supplied by Russia and the Middle East countries.

In spite of this, the Central European of the ABMD has not been abandoned by the USA, it has been, however, delayed and it will depend on Europe if it supplies a pretext for the U.S. to leave over the defense of Europe to Europeans only. The new attitude to ballistic anti-missile defense was very disturbing for Poland and especially for the Czech Republic, which pushed through the signing of the bilateral Czech-U.S. treaty on the radar base against a mainstream public opinion. Anyway, 2008/2009 represented the final accomplishment of several years lasting negotiations on the ABMD in Central Europe.

Official Czech Position towards the U.S. – Czech Bilateral Treaty

The Czech Republic signed the Treaty on Anti-missile radar base on 22 September 2008.1 The U.S. – Czech negotiations were less turbulent than the U.S. – Polish ones.2 The radar station should have served as a counterpart to the Poland-base

1. The Czech Republic Signed the Treaty on Anti-Missile Radar Base on 22 September 2008, 22. 9. 2008,
2. Gorka-Winter, Beata, With or Without the Shield? On the Tough Negotiations Between Poland and the United States, Lubomir Luptak, Robert Ondrejcsak, Tomas Valasek (eds), Panorama, Mapping Security Discourse 2007-2008, Bratislava, CENAA 200835 anti-missile compound, but both European NATO countries were proceeding quite independently in their negotiations with the USA.

Unlike Poland, the Czech position was aggravated by the fact that the public opinion was much more opposed to the treaty and also to the domestic political reality: at that time, the government coalition led by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) could not promise a majority of MP’s in the Lower Chamber of the Czech Parliament and the ODS-led coalition was brought down short after the Czech Republic took over the EU presidency in 2009. The ratification of the ABMD treaty in the Czech Parliament after new elections planned for the fall of 2009 was, therefore, not guaranteed at all. The problem was ‘solved’ by the U.S. president B. Obama by announcing that the USA abandoned the idea of a „twin“ ABMD project (Poland and Czech Republic).3 The surprising decision made by the new U. S. president B. Obama has not removed the doubts about the threat posed by Iranian missiles. Just now (2012), vis a vis the problems the Iranian nuclear (and missile) projects one can see the reasons, why the ballistic anti-missile in Central Europe seemed to have its deep sense.

[…]

„Russian factor“

The Russian resistance against the ABMD in Central Europe (CZ, PL) seems to correspond to the recent Russian efforts to play, once more, a more articulated great power policy in both the world, and the regional (Central Eastern Europe) arena. Among the views on the „Russian factor“, the following ones were prominent: the RF seems to regard the presence of US military staff at the territory of former Soviet satellites as a further step in loss of Russian (former Soviet) influence in Central Europe and as an obstacle for possible future attempt at restoring its foregone hegemony there; the declared feeling of threat (from the ABMD) for the RF can hardly relate to a real military threat: one has to see the Russian opposition to the ABMD in terms of „securitization“, i.e. of utilization of the issue for domestic political goals, this approach (securitization) has been widely recognized as a tool for mobilizing domestic support for official policy, once sensitive aspects of national security (identity, sovereignty, WMD) have been involved, admittedly, if the thesis about the Russia’s effort to relapse into hegemonic past is correct, then the Russia is quite legitimate in opposing the AMD, seeing in it provocation, threat and disturbing the balance/status quo following the US – Russia arrangement after the last enlargement rounds, one should admit realistically that the ABMD in Central Europe can be turned into a mechanism defending Europe against Russian military threats in the future: in this respect, the Russia´s objections to ABMD might be legitimate supposed that the RF has still not relinquished her traditional offensive hegemonic strategy towards Central Eastern Europe; one of the solutions might be to offer the Russia a cooperative security arrangement, i. e. to engage Russia (president Obama’s recent appearance in Moscow has gone in this direction); According to this security philosophy, Russia should become a part of such an arrangement. This is, admittedly, an ideal solution, which might be rejected not only by a lot of experts, but also by the very reality as unrealistic.

Conclusion

The ABMD in Central Europe has to a geopolitical tug of war between Russia and „The very reality„ can – according to the author – relate to a lot of variables like the Russian de facto support for the Iranian nuclear program, a repetition of Russian aggression against one or more of her former „Soviet republics„ which are outside NATO, Russian military reactions against ´centrifugal´ forces at the territory of Northern Caucasus or in „Eastern Russian territories„.

As could be expected, the ABMD issue was easily turned into an ideological struggle for the new orientation of the whole Central Eastern European region. The ABMD got into several deep problems: unstable political scene in the Czech Republic, new foreign-policy accents of the Obama administration, Russian revisionism and Russian efforts to be brought back to „old good“ times, when Russia (Soviet Union) played a decisive role in the bi-polar world on equal terms with the USA. There are many variables in the ABMD game, but the most important to be solved is the further development of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic program. Facing the prevailing Iranian threat in 2012, the U.S. decision to grant (the increasingly Islamist) Turkey with the privilege to host the ABMD system does not seem to be a very happy solution.

Dr. Ivo Samson, specially for BC, Bratislava, Baltic-course.com

Ivo Samson is the author, senior research fellow at the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association in Bratislava and a university teacher at the Institute of Political Science in Presov, Slovakia.

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